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Footnotes
1. See AARP Research Group, LEGAL DOCUMENTS AMONG THE 50+
POPULATION: FINDINGS FROM AN AARP SURVEY 5 (2000),
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ econ/will.pdf (reporting that 45%
of Americans age 50 or older reported having a power of attorney
for finances, with this rate increasing with age and 73% of those
80 and over having one). In addition, surveys suggest that the
majority of older adults have appointed an agent to make health-
care decisions for them in the event they cannot make such deci-
sions for themselves. See Jaya K. Rao et al., Completion of Advance
Directives Among U.S. Consumers, 46 AM. J. PREV. MED. 65, 68
(2014) (finding, based on a national mail survey, that more than
two-thirds of adults age 55 and over had an advance directive).
2. A durable power of attorney is increasingly referred to simply as
a power of attorney (POA) and this article adopts this modern
practice. Indeed, the Uniform Power of Attorney Act takes the
position that all powers of attorney are durable unless they state
otherwise and thus uses the term “power of attorney” only. See
UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2006).
3. While actual numbers are unknown, an estimated 1.5 million
people in the United States are subject to guardianship or conser-
vatorship.
Surrogate decision-making arrangements are ubiquitous.Surveys suggest that the majority of older Americanshave a surrogate decision maker who is empowered to
make decisions on their behalf, most commonly an agent
appointed under a power of attorney (“POA”) for finances or
for health care.1 The result is that attorneys frequently repre-
sent clients who have a surrogate decision maker with the
authority to make decisions on the matter underlying the rep-
resentation.
From the perspective of the attorney, such representations
raise several important questions. First, from whom should the
attorney take direction? Should the attorney look to the surro-
gate or to the person for whom the surrogate has been
appointed? Second, with whom should the attorney communi-
cate? Should the attorney share information with the surro-
gate, the individual who appointed the surrogate, or both? 
From the perspective of a court, such representations also
raise important questions. If an attorney claims to represent a
principal for whom a surrogate has been appointed, should the
court expect the attorney to take direction from the principal
and communicate with the principal? If the attorney is not
doing so, should the court treat the principal as an unrepre-
sented party? In addition, if the attorney is not doing so,
should the attorney’s behavior be seen as a red flag suggesting
exploitation? 
This article seeks to provide guidance on the proper role of
the attorney when representing an individual for whom a sur-
rogate decision maker has been appointed. Specifically, it con-
siders two types of surrogates: (1) agents appointed pursuant
to a POA for finances,2 and (2) guardians or conservators
appointed by a court.3 In doing so, it seeks to inform the
courts about expectations for attorney behavior. This is valu-
able not only so that judges can be confident that the attorneys
appearing before them actually represent the persons whom
they allege to represent. It is also valuable because it may
empower judges to identify cases in which an attorney is either
consciously or unwittingly facilitating an agent’s exploitation
of a vulnerable person.
I. CLIENTS WITH AGENTS APPOINTED UNDER POWERS
OF ATTORNEY
A. THE CHALLENGE
Imagine that an individual comes to an attorney’s office and
presents a document that, by all appearances, is a valid POA
appointing that person as the agent (also called an “attorney-
in-fact”) for the individual who executed the document (the
“principal”). The individual asks the attorney to assist the
agent in performing an act that appears to be fully authorized
by the document. May the attorney assist? Does the attorney
have any obligation to the principal to determine the validity
of the document or to otherwise question the agent’s direc-
tions? Should and must the attorney alert the principal to the
request? And to what extent should the attorney disclose infor-
mation provided by the agent to the principal?
Similarly, imagine an attorney appears in court and identi-
fies herself as counsel to the principal. Appearing with her is
the agent appointed under the document and it is apparent
that the attorney is taking direction from the agent. Should the
court inquire as to whether the principal has been consulted or
agrees to the course of action? Should the court require the
principal’s presence? Does the answer depend on whether the
attorney reports that the principal is incapacitated? Does the
answer depend on whether the agent’s actions advantage the
agent or the agent’s associates personally?
B. THE ATTORNEY’S ROLE
When an individual who has appointed an agent under a
POA seeks representation, an attorney may look to the indi-
vidual for direction as if no such document had been executed.
This is because execution of a POA does not limit the powers
of the person executing it. Rather, the principal retains all
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4. Cf. In re Runge, 858 N.W.2d 901, 907 (N.D. 2015) (holding that
an attorney had no ethical duty to consult with an agent
appointed pursuant to a POA for health care before assisting the
principal in revoking the agent’s authority because “no guardian-
ship or conservatorship existed that withdrew [the principal’s]
authority to act for himself. Rather, [the principal] shared his
authority to act and he remained free to withdraw the authority
conferred under that power of attorney . . . .”).
5. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2002).
6. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2002).
7. 858 N.W.2d at 907.
8. 124 A.3d 1078 (DC Ct. App. 2015).
9. 124 A.3d at 1087–88 (considering the propriety of an attorney
taking action under the direction of an agent without consulting
the principal).
10. In addition, if the attorney determines that the principal wishes to
provide direction, the attorney can also use the meeting to assess
the extent to which the principal wishes to have information
about the representation shared with the agent.
11. Communication may be beneficial to the principal even if the
principal wishes to delegate provision of direction to the agent.
Communication may empower principals who have the ability to
monitor the agent and potentially to withdraw the agent’s author-
ity if the agent is acting in a matter that is inconsistent with the
principal’s wishes.
12. Reports of POA abuse are common and the elder protection com-
munity has identified POA abuse an important concern. See Nina
A. Kohn, Elder Empowerment as a Strategy for Curbing the Hidden
Abuses of Durable Powers of Attorney, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 5-7
(2006). It is estimated that in excess of 5% of older adults are sub-
ject to major financial exploitation, a category that includes POA
abuse. See RON ACIERNO, MELBA HERNANDEZ-TEJADA, WENDY
MUZZY & KENNETH STEVE, NATIONAL ELDER MISTREATMENT STUDY 6
(March 2009), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
rights he or she had before execution of the document, includ-
ing the right to engage the services of an attorney.4
The challenging issue for the lawyer is not whether the
lawyer may take direction from the principal, but whether the
lawyer must take direction from the principal. Such a situation
may arise where the agent seeks to engage the attorney to rep-
resent the principal, but seeks to limit the attorney’s interac-
tions with the principal. Here, the leading sources of ethical
guidance fail to provide the level of clarity that might be
expected given the frequency with which the issue arises. 
The only time the issue is addressed in the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct is in the comments to Rule 1.14, the rule
that addresses attorneys’ duties to clients with diminished
capacity (a situation that only captures a subset of persons who
have executed POAs). Comment 2 to Rule 1.14 instructs the
attorney to “as far as possible accord the represented person
the status of client, particularly in maintaining communica-
tion.”5 By contrast, Comment 4 to Rule 1.14 states, “If a legal
representative has already been appointed for the client, the
lawyer should ordinarily look to the representative for deci-
sions on behalf of the client.”6 Thus, while one comment indi-
cates that the attorney’s default approach should be to act as
the attorney would if no such surrogate had been appointed,
the other suggests the opposite default. 
While the Comments cannot be fully reconciled, the under-
lying text of the Model Rules suggests that one way to reduce
the inconsistency is to read Comment 4 narrowly. That text
directs attorneys to maintain a normal attorney-client relation-
ship with limited exceptions, and taking direction from some-
one other than the client is not ordinary practice.
Recent court cases considering whether attorneys acted
properly in refusing to take direction from an agent provide
further support for the conclusion that Comment 4 should be
read narrowly. In the 2015 case of In re Runge,7 the North
Dakota Supreme Court took the position that Comment 4’s
direction to look to the agent for decisions was not applicable
where an attorney had independently assessed the client’s
capacity and determined that the client had capacity to make
the legal decision at issue. The same year, in In re Szymowitz,8
the D.C. Court of Appeals found that Comment 4’s direction
did not apply to a situation where
the surrogate transferred property
to himself because such “self-
dealing” was “not ordinary” prac-
tice.9 Together, these cases sug-
gest that attorneys act appropri-
ately in refusing to take direction
from an agent when a principal
with capacity wishes to provide
that direction or when an agent is
engaged in self-dealing (even
absent a finding that the self-deal-
ing constitutes a breach of the
agent’s fiduciary duty). Thus, when an attorney is asked by an
agent appointed under a POA to represent the principal, best
practice will typically be to meet with the principal before
undertaking the representation. This will allow the attorney to
determine whether the principal has the ability to provide
direction and wishes to do so, or whether the principal either
lacks that ability or would prefer to delegate to the agent.10 It
will also allow the attorney to determine the extent to which
the principal wishes to receive communication about the rep-
resentation.11 In addition, such a meeting provides an oppor-
tunity for the attorney to assess whether, including by making
the request for representation, the agent is acting in a manner
consistent with the agent’s fiduciary duty.
Best practice typically will involve such a meeting even if
the agent represents to the attorney that the principal lacks the
capacity to provide direction. Such representations by agents
are not always truthful. In some cases, the agent may not
appreciate the individual’s abilities. In other cases, the agent
may be deliberately misleading the attorney in an attempt to
use the attorney’s services to accomplish a task the agent
knows to be inconsistent with the principal’s wishes or inter-
ests. Indeed, it appears that a significant portion of financial
exploitation is accomplished through the misuse of a POA,12
sometimes with the assistance of an attorney who (presumably
unwittingly) assists the agent with transactions that constitute
impermissible self-dealing. Meeting with the principal at the
outset of the representation, especially not in the presence of
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grants/226456.pdf (last visited May 20, 2017). However, there is
not currently a clear estimate of the rate of POA-specific abuse
although attempts at estimation have been made. See, e.g., LINDA
S. WHITTON, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, NATIONAL DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY SURVEY
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS (2002), available at http://www.uniforml-
aws.org/shared/docs/power %20of%20attorney/dpasurveyre-
port_102902.pdf (last visited May 20, 2017) (reporting that 64%
of 371 attorneys surveyed by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws had encountered abuse by an
agent acting under a POA and nearly a quarter had encountered
more than ten instances of such abuse); Hans A. Lapping, License
to Steal: Implied Gift-Giving Authority and Powers of Attorney, 4
ELDER L. J. 143, 167-68 (1996) (citing a student-conducted study
by Albany Law School’s Government Law Center). 
13. A key issue for the attorney to determine at the outset of the rep-
resentation, therefore, is whether the attorney is representing the
principal or the agent. The American College of Trusts and
Estates Counsel has taken the position that which role the attor-
ney has depends on whether the attorney had a prior attorney-
client relationship with the principal. If the attorney did, then the
principal is the client. If the lawyer did not, then the lawyer rep-
resents only the fiduciary. See AM. COLL. OF TRUSTS & ESTATE
COUNSEL, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 162 (5th ed. 2016). 
14. The American College of Trusts and Estate Counsel contemplates
that the lawyer for the fiduciary will owe duties to the “disabled
person,” including to “to disclose, to prevent, or to rectify the
fiduciary’s misconduct.” Id. This is a more expansive position
than that taken by Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (allowing an
attorney to reveal “information relating to the representation . . .
to prevent, mitigate, or rectify substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result
or has resulted from the client’s commission of a crime or fraud in
furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services.”). 
15. For example, in a number of states, the right to vote is retained as
a matter of law. See Sally Balch Hurme & Paul S. Appelbaum,
Defining and Assessing Capacity to Vote: The Effect of Mental
Impairment on the Rights of Voters, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 931, 950
(2007).
the agent, can thus help thwart
such exploitation.
Should the agent seek to
restrict interaction with the
principal, best practice will
typically be for the attorney to
refuse to represent the princi-
pal under such circumstances.
A request to restrict disclo-
sures to the principal is a red
flag that the agent may be
attempting to abuse the agent’s
authority, and an attorney is
well-advised to avoid situa-
tions in which the attorney’s services may be used in further-
ance of unlawful activity. In certain cases, if the attorney
believes that the agent has good reasons for limiting disclosure,
the attorney might reasonably agree to represent the agent in
the agent’s role as a fiduciary.13 Representing the agent instead
of the principal has the potential to significantly reduce the
need to involve the principal, although it may not obviate the
need for disclosure. Even if the attorney merely represents the
agent, the attorney has certain duties to the principal, which
may include a duty to prevent the agent from misconduct or to
disclose such misconduct.14
C. THE COURT’S ROLE
Courts should be alert to the possibility that attorneys
appearing in front of them on behalf of a principal may be tak-
ing direction from the agent. In many cases, such an approach
is perfectly appropriate. However, it is not enough for the court
simply to review the appointing document to see that the
agent’s actions fall within the powers granted to the agent.
Especially where the agent has a personal interest in the out-
come of the matter before the court (e.g., where the transaction
would benefit the agent or an associate of the agent), the court
should consider the possibility that the representation may be
inconsistent with the agent’s fiduciary duty. By being vigilant to
such possibilities, the court may be able to avoid assisting the
agent in accomplishing improper acts or exploitation of the
principal. 
Courts should also recognize that the principal who has the
capacity to engage and direct an attorney is free to do so, and
that the attorney need neither consult with nor defer to the
agent in such situations. Likewise, when the principal has
capacity and objects to the agent’s actions, courts should insist
that an attorney appearing on behalf of the principal take
direction from the principal, not the agent.
II. CLIENTS WITH APPOINTED GUARDIANS OR 
CONSERVATORS
A. THE CHALLENGE
Challenging situations also arise for attorneys and for
courts when attorneys represent a person subject to guardian-
ship or conservatorship. Such representations may arise in a
variety of contexts. An individual subject to guardianship or
conservatorship may seek to challenge something related to
that arrangement—ranging from its very existence, to the pow-
ers granted the guardian, to the appointment of a particular
person as guardian or conservator. The individual may also
seek representation to address an issue unrelated to the
guardianship or conservatorship, including an issue with
regard to which the person has retained rights. These rights
may either be retained because they are retained as a matter of
state law (e.g., are not removed even when an appointment is
plenary)15 or because the court only partially removed rights
(e.g., in the case of a limited guardianship).
B. THE ATTORNEY’S ROLE
From an attorney’s perspective, two overarching issues arise
when asked to represent an individual subject to guardianship
or conservatorship: (1) may the attorney accept the represen-
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16. Traditionally, such persons have been said to be found “incapaci-
tated” and are called “wards.” The modern approach is to focus
not on the person’s status but on whether the person’s needs can
be met short of imposition of a guardianship, and to replace the
stigmatizing word “ward” with person-centered language.
17. The term “guardian” is typically used to refer to a person
appointed by a court to make decisions with respect to the per-
sonal affairs of an individual who has been adjudicated unable to
make those decisions, and the term “conservator” is typically
used to refer to a person who is appointed by a court to make
decisions with respect to the property and financial affairs of an
individual who has been adjudicated by a court to be unable to
make those decisions. However, some states use the term
“guardian” to refer to both types of appointees, and a few states
use the term conservator to apply to both. See Nina A. Kohn,
Matched Preferences and Values: A New Approach to Selecting Legal
Surrogates, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 399, 402 n.7 (2015) (discussing
state differences in terminology). 
18. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Zaltman, 843 N.E.2d 663, 664
(Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (requiring an evidentiary hearing to deter-
mine whether a woman had capacity to retain counsel to chal-
lenge the guardianship before permitting her to engage such
counsel). 
19. See generally, Nina A. Kohn & Catheryn Koss, Lawyers for Legal
Ghosts: The Ethics and Legality of Representing Persons Subject to
Guardianship, 91 WASHINGTON L. REV. 581 (2016). 
20. As courts have recognized, constitutional due-process guarantees
prohibit such an interpretation. Moreover, the doctrine of neces-
saries has been recognized as giving rise to a claim for fees by an
attorney who supplies legal services to an incapacitated individ-
ual, including those subject to guardianship seeking to terminate
that guardianship. See id. at 591–97.
21. Agents are only prohibited from performing acts the principal
cannot perform See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.04(1)
(AM. LAW INST.2006). Individuals subject to guardianship retain
many rights. These include those powers not delegated to the
guardian because the appointment is limited or because state
statutory law allows persons subject to guardianship to retain
them. It also includes the right to challenge the terms and condi-
tions of the guardianship as constitutional due-process protec-
tions render these retained rights as well. Thus, agency law does
not bar attorney representation as to these issues. For further dis-
cussion of this point, see Kohn & Koss, supra note 19, at 589–91.
22. For further discussion of this issue, see Kohn & Koss, supra note
19, at 602–04.
23. See In re Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d 419, 425 (Surr. Ct. 2010) (find-
ing that an individual subject to guardianship had a due-process
right to periodic review of the arrangement). Similarly, it is gen-
erally accepted that constitutional due-process guarantees require
individuals for whom a guardian or conservator is sought have
notice of those proceedings and an opportunity to be heard. See,
e.g., Susan G. Haines & John J. Campbell, Defects, Due Process,
and Protective Proceedings, 2 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 13, 15–16
(2000) (discussing due-process jurisprudence as applied to
guardianship proceedings).
24. Notably, the durable POA is a statutory creation that was specifi-
cally designed to overcome this common-law rule. For a history
of the POA, see Kohn, supra note 12, at 5-7.
tation, and (2) if the attorney accepts the representation, from
whom does the attorney take direction and with whom does
the attorney communicate?
1. Permissible Scope of Representation
Individuals subject to guardianship or conservatorship16
have been found by a court to be unable to make some deci-
sions for themselves and have had the right to make those
decisions delegated to a third party (alternatively called a
“guardian” or “conservator”).17 This has led some to conclude
that attorneys cannot represent such persons.18 This conclu-
sion is understandable as attorneys generally can only repre-
sent those with capacity to contract to engage the attorney and
to provide the attorney with direction as part of that represen-
tation. Nevertheless, it is erroneous. 
There is no common-law prohibition on attorneys repre-
senting people subject to guardianship. Despite some sugges-
tions to the contrary, as the author and a colleague explored in
a prior article,19 neither contract law20 nor agency law21 pre-
clude such representations. 
The conclusion that persons subject to guardianship cannot
engage an attorney is also, moreover, inconsistent with state
statutory law. Many states have adopted statutes that explicitly
or implicitly require that persons subject to guardianship be
permitted to engage counsel to represent their interests in cer-
tain conditions. In some states, there is an explicit right to
counsel, for example, to seek restoration of rights. Even more
states have adopted the “least restrictive alternative” standard
that requires a similar result. Denying an individual subject to
guardianship or conservatorship the ability to engage an attor-
ney to assist with matters
related to retained rights
(including the right to chal-
lenge the existence, terms, or
conditions of the arrangement)
violates the standard by deny-
ing the individual more rights
than is necessary for the indi-
vidual’s protection.22
Most importantly, denying
the right to counsel would vio-
late the constitutional rights of
individuals subject to guardian-
ship and conservatorship. Such individuals retain substantial
due-process rights, and exercising those rights may require
representation.23 These rights cannot be protected simply by
allowing a guardian or court to engage an attorney to represent
the individual. When the individual is challenging the exis-
tence, terms, or conditions of the appointment, the guardian or
conservator has a conflict of interest and may even be the indi-
vidual’s primary adversary. 
Although individuals subject to guardianship or conserva-
torship thus can have a right to engage an attorney, the right
is constrained. Consistent with the common-law agency prin-
ciple that an agent can only do what the principal can do,24
such persons only have a right to engage an attorney to repre-
sent them with regard to rights that are retained. However,
retained rights are not simply those rights that a court does
not strip from the particular individual. Retained rights are
also rights that state or federal law render unaffected by the
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25. Notably, these vary by state but may include fundamental rights
such as the right to vote.
26. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14(b).
27. See id. at r. 1.14(b)–(c).
28. For a decision tree outlining attorneys’ ethical duties in this
regard, see Kohn & Koss, supra note 19, at 631.
29. For a comprehensive review and discussion of state bar opinions
and court opinions on this matter, see Kohn & Koss, supra note
19, at 619–30.
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24(3) (AM.
LAW INST. 2000).
31. Id. cmt. f (“If the lawyer believes the guardian to be acting lawfully
but inconsistently with the best interests of the client, the lawyer
may remonstrate with the guardian or withdraw . . . .”).
32. It is unfortunate that some courts have mistakenly concluded that
individuals subject to guardianship cannot retain counsel or that
counsel might have to obtain court approval for engaging in such
representations.
33. There is no credible national estimate of the rate of abuse by
guardians, but reports of abuse are not uncommon. See U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-33, ELDER ABUSE: THE
EXTENT OF ABUSE BY GUARDIANS IS UNKNOWN, BUT SOME MEASURES
EXIST TO HELP PROTECT OLDER ADULTS, 6–11 (2016) (discussing
the current state of knowledge); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF., GAO-10-1046, GUARDIANSHIPS: CASES OF FINANCIAL
EXPLOITATION, NEGLECT AND ABUSE OF SENIORS, (2010) (conclud-
ing that the GAO could not determine whether guardianship
abuse is widespread, but identifying hundreds of allegations
during a 20-year period).
imposition of a guardianship
or conservatorship.25 Most
importantly, they include the
rights guaranteed as a matter of
constitutional right to due
process: the right to challenge
the existence of the guardian-
ship or the terms and condi-
tions of that guardianship. 
2. The Attorney’s Role
An attorney representing a
person subject to guardianship
or conservatorship on an issue as to which the individual has
a right to retain counsel (e.g., to challenge the existence of the
arrangement or its terms or conditions, to exercise other
retained rights, or to receive legal counsel about rights) has the
same role and ethical responsibilities as an attorney represent-
ing a client who is not subject to guardianship. This includes
the duty to provide competent representation, consult with the
individual, and take direction from the individual. This is not
to say the attorney can never deviate from the normal attorney-
client relationship. Just as with clients who have never been
adjudicated incapacitated, an attorney may—pursuant to
Model Rule 1.14—deviate from the normal relationship to take
“reasonably necessary protective action” when the lawyer rea-
sonably believes that a client has diminished capacity, is at risk
of substantial harm, and cannot act in her own interest.26 In
such situations, the attorney may reveal confidential informa-
tion or act without the consent of the client to the extent it is
“reasonably necessary to protect the client’s interests.”27 Thus,
even when protective action is appropriate, the client contin-
ues to be entitled to have her information kept confidential
unless the risk to the client justifies a breach of confidential-
ity.28
This approach is supported by state bar opinions and most
court opinions on point,29 as well as by the Restatement
(Third) of Law Governing Lawyers. The Restatement states the
general rule that an attorney should generally take direction
from a guardian, but recognizes two significant exceptions: (1)
for proceedings that are adversarial to the guardian, including
a petition to terminate the guardianship or remove the
guardian,30 and (2) in circumstances where the person subject
to guardianship has authority to act without the guardian’s
knowledge or permission (i.e., for retained rights).31
3. The Role of Courts
When faced with an attorney who purports to represent an
individual subject to guardianship or conservatorship, courts
should typically consider two questions: (1) does the individ-
ual have the authority to engage the attorney in this way, and
(2) is the attorney acting in a manner consistent with the
lawyer’s ethical duties.
As subsection B indicates, the answer to the first question
turns on what the underlying representation is about. If the
representation is to seek termination of the guardianship,
remove the guardian, or otherwise challenge the terms of con-
ditions of the guardianship, the individual has authority to
engage the attorney. Likewise, if the representation is for the
purpose of explaining his or her rights to the individual or pro-
viding assistance with regard to a retained right, the individual
also has authority to engage the attorney. By contrast, the indi-
vidual lacks authority to hire counsel to directly represent the
person to accomplish a transaction or other objective that the
person has been stripped of the right to pursue. Thus, by way
of example, if the person has had the right to sell property
removed, an attorney cannot represent the individual in the
sale of the home, but may represent the person in a proceeding
to restore the right to sell the property.
It is critical that courts not interfere with the right of an
individual subject to guardianship or conservatorship to
engage counsel in such situations.32 While all indications are
that the vast majority of guardians perform their duties in good
faith, this is not uniformly the case. Guardianships and con-
servatorships can, unfortunately, be a site of exploitation.
Reports of guardians and conservators exploiting those for
whom they are appointed abound.33 Attorney representation of
individuals subject to guardianship or conservatorship is one
antidote to abuse. An attorney can help the individual under-
stand her continuing rights, seek the removal of a guardian or
conservator who is misusing authority, and petition for the ter-
mination of an unnecessary guardianship or conservatorship.
Moreover, such representation is critical in situations in which
individuals seek to restore their rights by either terminating a
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34. See Jenica Cassidy, Restoration of Rights in the Termination of Adult
Guardianship, 23 ELDER L.J. 83, 121 (2015) (“one of the greatest
barriers to restoration is the ability of the protected individual to
hire counsel”). 
35. Such payments are permitted by the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, but are suspect. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.
1.8(f)(“A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a
client from one other than the client unless: (1) the client gives
informed consent; (2) there is no interference with the lawyer’s
independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer
relationship; and (3) information relating to representation of a
client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.”).
guardianship or conservatorship or, at least, reducing the pow-
ers delegated to the guardian or conservator.34
The answer to the second question, is the attorney acting
consistent with his or her ethical responsibilities, is most likely
to arise when there is reason to believe that the purported
counsel for the individual subject to guardianship or conser-
vator represents an interest of a person other than that indi-
vidual. Unfortunately, many guardianships and conservator-
ships occur in the context of intense intra-family disputes.
When the counsel has been arranged or paid for by a person
other than the individual subject to guardianship or conserva-
torship,35 a court may have a reasonable concern as to whether
the counsel is truly taking direction from the individual or
from someone else. 
Where the court has reason to suspect the individual is not
being truly represented by the attorney, the court may wish to
appoint a guardian ad litem, visitor, or similar person to make
further inquiries. In limited situations, the court may wish to
go further and appoint counsel for the individual. Which
approach is preferable will likely depend both on the rules of
practice for the jurisdiction and on the nature of the matter
before the court.
In short, while the notion that a person who has been
stripped of legal capacity or adjudicated unable to make legal
decisions would be able to hire an attorney may seem incon-
gruous at first blush, it is imperative that courts facilitate—not
impede—such representations. To be sure, courts should be
vigilant to the possibility that purported counsel for the indi-
vidual may be acting pursuant to the direction of someone else.
But where the attorney is truly taking direction from the person
on a matter which the person has a right to pursue, counsel
should be treated as would any other lawyer before the court.
III. CONCLUSION
It is critical for courts to understand the appropriate role of
attorneys who represent individuals with appointed surro-
gates. While all indications are that most surrogates are faith-
ful and act in a manner consistent with their fiduciary duties,
the unfortunate reality is that many do not. Being alert to the
possibility that attorneys appearing on behalf of a person for
whom a surrogate is appointed may not actually be acting at
that person’s direction or in that person’s interest allows courts
to potentially prevent certain forms of exploitation. Likewise,
by recognizing that attorneys can represent those with
appointed surrogates—including those subject to plenary
guardianship or conservatorship—courts can play a role in rec-
tifying abuse, when it does occur, by ensuring that such per-
sons have access to the judicial system. 
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